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The ‘‘Odious Scourge’’: Evolving
Interpretations of the Crime of Genocide
William A. Schabas
National University of Ireland, Galway,
and Irish Centre for Human Rights
The crime of genocide was defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in reaction to the concept of crimes against
humanity developed at Nuremberg, which insisted upon a connection with
aggressive war in prosecutions for atrocity crimes. The convention stated genocide
could be committed in time of peace, but it also narrowed the scope of the crime
itself to the intentional destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.
Cultural genocide was intentionally excluded. Although the text of the definition
remains unchanged, judicial interpretation has broadened it significantly. Recent
decisions have held that there is no requirement of a state plan or policy. They have
also set out a subjective approach to identification of the protected group. Although
cultural genocide in an extensive sense is still not recognized within the definition,
there is a definite tendency to extend the concept to what is colloquially called
‘‘ethnic cleansing.’’ These broadening definitions influence determinations about
genocides, even those committed many years ago.

When hundreds of thousands of Armenians living within the Ottoman Empire
perished in 1915,1 the governments of France, Great Britain, and Russia responded
with an unprecedented declaration. Dated 24 May 1915, it asserts that ‘‘in the
presence of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization, the allied
Governments publicly inform the Sublime Porte that they will hold personally
responsible for the said crimes all members of the Ottoman Government as well as
those of its agents who are found to be involved in such massacres.’’2 It has been
suggested that this constitutes the first use, at least within an international law
context, of the term ‘‘crimes against humanity.’’3
According to the Treaty of Sèvres, signed on 10 August 1920, Turkey recognized
the right of trial ‘‘notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal
in Turkey’’ and was obliged to surrender ‘‘all persons accused of having committed
an act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are specified either by name
or by rank, office or employment which they held under Turkish authorities.’’4
This formulation is similar to the war crimes clauses in the Treaty of Versailles.5 But
the Treaty of Sèvres contains a major innovation, contemplating prosecution for
the massacres committed within Turkey by the Turkish regime, as well as of war
crimes committed against Allied soldiers or civilians within occupied territories.
Pursuant to article 230,
The Turkish Government undertakes to hand over to the Allied Powers the persons
whose surrender may be required by the latter as being responsible for the massacres
committed during the continuance of the state of war on territory which formed part of
the Turkish Empire on the 1st August, 1914. The Allied Powers reserve to themselves
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the right to designate the Tribunal which shall try the persons so accused, and the
Turkish Government undertakes to recognise such Tribunal. In the event of the League
of Nations having created in sufficient time a Tribunal competent to deal with the said
massacres, the Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to bring the accused
persons mentioned above before the Tribunal, and the Turkish Government undertakes
equally to recognise such Tribunal.6

Though signed by all the parties, including Turkey, the Treaty of Sèvres was never
ratified and never, therefore, came into force. As Kay Holloway writes, the failure of
the signatories to bring the treaty into effect ‘‘resulted in the abandonment of
thousands of defenceless peoples—Armenians and Greeks—to the fury of their
persecutors, by engendering subsequent holocausts in which the few survivors of the
1915 Armenian massacres perished.’’7 The Treaty of Sèvres was replaced on 24 July
1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne,8 an instrument that contains a ‘‘Declaration of
Amnesty’’ for all offences committed between 1 August 1914 and 20 November 1922.
When the Armenian massacres took place, the term ‘‘genocide’’ did not yet exist.
It was not devised until three decades later, in 1944, by a Polish-Jewish law professor,
Raphael Lemkin, by then living in exile in the United States, in his book Axis Rule in
Occupied Europe.9 Rarely has a neologism had such rapid success.10 Within little more
than a year of its introduction into the English language,11 the word ‘‘genocide’’ was
being used in the indictment of the International Military Tribunal, and within two,
it was the subject of a UN General Assembly resolution.12 But the resolution spoke in
the past tense, describing genocide as crimes that ‘‘have occurred.’’ By the time the
General Assembly had completed its initial standard setting in this area, with the 1948
adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (UNCG), ‘‘genocide’’ had a detailed and quite technical definition as a crime
against the law of nations. The preamble of that instrument recognizes ‘‘that at all
periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity.’’ Genocide is
described as ‘‘the odious scourge.’’13

‘‘Crimes against Humanity’’ or ‘‘Genocide’’
When the term ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ was initially used by the Allies in 1915 to
describe the Armenian massacres, it had no recognized definition. In 1945, the London
Conference, composed of the four victorious powers (the United States, France,
the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union), codified the term as a basis for the
prosecution of Nazi criminals. They defined it as follows:
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the court where perpetrated.14

The term was meant to cover atrocities committed within Germany against
Germans, as distinction from war crimes, which were committed against non-German
combatants or against civilians in occupied territories. The concept of ‘‘war crimes’’
had long been recognized as customary international law and was codified in the
regulations annexed to the fourth Hague Convention of 1907.15 It was more than
adequate to deal with the atrocities committed by the Nazis in occupied territories. But
the idea that a government and its own officials could be held responsible for atrocities
committed within their own borders against their own nationals was a bold leap
forward in international law. This helps us to understand the guarded remarks of US
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Secretary of State Robert Lansing, who, in 1915, admitted what he called the ‘‘more or
less justifiable’’ right of the Turkish government to deport the Armenians to the extent
that they lived ‘‘within the zone of military operations.’’ But, he said,
it was not to my mind the deportation which was objectionable but the horrible
brutality which attended its execution. It is one of the blackest pages in the history of
this war, and I think we were fully justified in intervening as we did on behalf of the
wretched people, even though they were Turkish subjects.16

In 1945, although the victorious great powers accepted that the post-war
prosecutions should include crimes committed within Germany against German
civilians, they were nervous about the extent of the concept of ‘‘crimes against
humanity,’’ because, in recognizing that application of international law to atrocities
committed against a state’s own civilian population, they left themselves vulnerable
to eventual prosecution as well. At the time, lynching of African-Americans was
relatively widespread within the United States, and several American jurisdictions
imposed a form of apartheid whose features are well known. The British and the
French, with their colonial territories in Africa and Asia, and the Soviets, who had just
deported millions from Chechnya and Ingushetia, were similarly exposed. For this
reason, the four parties at the London Conference imposed what has come to be known
as the ‘‘nexus,’’ namely, a requirement that crimes against humanity be committed
‘‘in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.’’ Consequently,
crimes against humanity, as defined at Nuremberg, could be committed only within
the context of war crimes or crimes against peace. They could not, pursuant to the
definition, be committed in peacetime.17
Robert Jackson, the head of the US delegation at the London Conference, speaking
of the proposed crime of ‘‘atrocities, persecutions, and deportations on political, racial
or religious grounds’’ (this was how the concept of ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ was first
identified in the debates), revealed the lingering concerns of his government:
Ordinarily we do not consider that the acts of a government toward its own citizens
warrant our interference. We have some regrettable circumstances at times in our own
country in which minorities are unfairly treated. We think it is justifiable that we
interfere or attempt to bring retribution to individuals or to states only because the
concentration camps and the deportations were in pursuance of a common plan or
enterprise of making an unjust or illegal war in which we became involved. We see no
other basis on which we are justified in reaching the atrocities which were committed
inside Germany, under German law, or even in violation of German law, by authorities
of the German state.18

The International Military Tribunal, sitting at Nuremberg in 1945 and 1946,
confirmed the limited scope of crimes against humanity in its final judgment.
Although there was frequent reference to the preparations for the war and to the Nazi
atrocities committed in the early years of the Third Reich, no conviction was registered
for any act committed prior to 1 September 1939.19 Despite what has sometimes been
suggested as an ambiguity in the Nuremberg Charter, the judges of the International
Military Tribunal were faithful to the intent of the drafters. They entrenched the
nexus between crimes against humanity and aggressive war.

Defining Genocide
Dissatisfaction and frustration with this limited concept of ‘‘crimes against humanity’’
emerged in the final months of 1946, within days of the judgment at Nuremberg.
The initiatives came from states in what would later be called the Third World,
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specifically India, Cuba, Panama, and Saudi Arabia. Unlike the great powers, who
feared that a broad scope for the term ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ might ultimately
rebound to challenge repressive acts committed by them within their far-flung
empires, the vulnerable emerging states of the underdeveloped world contemplated
an instrument that would protect them. For the latter, it was a priority to recognize
international criminalization of atrocities in peacetime, that is, applicable during
the banal everyday reality of colonial and postcolonial societies. They sought
and obtained this recognition, but only for a more narrowly described form of
crime against humanity: genocide. Article II of the 1948 UNCG defines genocide
as follows:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such:
(a)

Killing members of the group;

(b)

Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c)

Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d)

Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e)

Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

This was not the first attempt to define the term. In 1944, Lemkin had proposed
the following definition:
a co-ordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups
themselves. The objective of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and
social institutions of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic
existence of national groups and the destruction of the personal security, liberty,
health, dignity and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide
is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed
against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national
group.20

In a sense, Lemkin’s definition is narrow, in that it addresses crimes directed against
‘‘national groups’’ rather than against ‘‘groups’’ in general. At the same time,
it is broad, to the extent that it contemplates not only physical genocide but also
acts aimed at destroying the culture and livelihood of the group.
When Cuba, India, and Panama proposed that the question of genocide be put on
the agenda of the first session of the UN General Assembly, in late 1946,21 they did not
have a full-blown definition to suggest. Their draft resolution states that ‘‘genocide is a
denial of the right to existence of entire human groups in the same way as homicide is
the denial of the right to live for individual human beings.’’22 The result of this
initiative, Resolution 96(I), adopted on 11 December 1946, went somewhat further in
defining the crime:
Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the
denial of the right to live of individual human beings; such denial of the right of
existence shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the
form of cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups, and is
contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations. Many instances
of such crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, political and other
groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part . . .23
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These efforts at definition were taken into account during the subsequent work of
drafting the UNCG, but none was adopted. Lemkin’s emphasis on what would be
called ‘‘cultural genocide,’’ that is, the destruction of the group’s institutions rather
than of its physical existence, was bluntly dismissed,24 although a shadow of the idea
reappeared in the final version, which lists the forcible transfer of children from one
group to the other as a punishable act.25 As for the 1946 resolution of the General
Assembly, its inclusion of political groups was not reaffirmed. The result, in Article II
of the 1948 convention, is a definition that is exceedingly narrow. Arguably, it covers
only physical (and biological) destruction, with the minor exception of transferring
children. Moreover, the enumeration of targeted groups is limited to four cognate
concepts: race, religion, ethnicity, and nationality. For example, political and ‘‘other’’
groups are excluded, a tragic ‘‘blind spot’’ according to some critics.26 Other
commentators have proposed new definitions in order to enlarge the scope of the
term, especially the list of protected groups; among them are Stefan Glaser,27 Israel W.
Charny,28 Vahakn Dadrian,29 Helen Fein,30 and Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn.31
The most extreme position applies the term ‘‘genocide’’ to any and all groups.
According to Pieter Drost, one of the early advocates of this view, ‘‘a convention on
genocide cannot effectively contribute to the protection of certain described minorities
when it is limited to particular defined groups . . . It serves no purpose to restrict
international legal protection to some groups; firstly, because the protected members
always belong at the same time to other unprotected groups.’’32
This is not, however, the course that international law has followed. The 1948
definition has stood the test of time. Recently, it was included without significant
change in such instruments as the statutes of the ad hoc criminal tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,33 the International Law Commission’s Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind,34 and the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.35 Implementing legislation of the Rome Statute adopted
in many countries has confirmed the dominance of the 1948 definition in national
criminal law as well. To a large extent, the push to amend the definition became less
important with the parallel evolution in the definition of crimes against humanity,
principally in its extension to atrocities committed during peacetime. But if the
definition of genocide has remained unchanged, in recent years its interpretation has
undergone a process of considerable dynamism and radical evolution.

The Evolving Definition of Genocide
The decisions of the Israeli courts in Eichmann were the only significant judicial
interpretations of the definition in the 1948 UNCG for nearly five decades.36 On
4 September 1998, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its
first major judgment, convicting the bourgmestre of Taba commune of genocide for his
role in the 1994 slaughter of Tutsi civilians, including the systematic rape of women
and girls.37 Many similar judgments were to follow, as one by one the architects of
the 1994 genocide were brought to book. The case law of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) developed more slowly, to a large extent
because of a cautious policy on the part of the prosecutor in the indictment of suspects
for genocide, in addition to the ubiquitous counts of crimes against humanity and
war crimes. The hesitation was not misguided, because, of the handful of ICTY
prosecutions that proceeded in which genocide has been alleged, the majority has
resulted in acquittals on that count.38 But even the acquittals have provided important
judicial guidance as to the parameters of the concept. In August 2001, an ICTY Trial
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Chamber registered a first conviction for genocide, condemning a Bosnian Serb general
who had participated, albeit in a secondary role, in the massacre of 7,000 Muslim men
and boys at Srebrenica in July 1995.39 The conviction was subsequently upheld on
appeal.40 In January 2005, an ICTY Trial Chamber issued the second conviction for
genocide in what is arguably the most expansive interpretation yet.41 This now
relatively rich reservoir of judicial interpretation of the definition of genocide indicates
a tendency to enlarge the scope of the crime so as to cover cases of ‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’
which some jurists might think is better described under the rubric of ‘‘crimes against
humanity.’’ This trend toward a large and liberal interpretation may ultimately dilute
the terrible stigma that is attached to the crime of genocide. At the same time, it can
only complicate the attempts of those who attempt to challenge the use of the term
‘‘genocide’’ to characterize the 1915 massacres of the Armenian minority within
Turkey.

State Plan or Policy
It may seem self-evident that genocide cannot be committed without the existence of a
state plan or policy to physically exterminate the targeted group. Certainly, in the
cases of all three of the major genocides of the twentieth century—those of the
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, the Jews in occupied Europe, and the Rwandan
Tutsi—there is ample evidence of and little argument about the role played by the
state. Nevertheless, if this factor is implicit in the definition in the 1948 convention,
nothing in the text actually requires it. The ICTY has ruled that proof of a plan or
policy is not a legal ingredient of the crime of genocide. The Appeals Chamber has
noted, nevertheless, that ‘‘in the context of proving specific intent, the existence of a
plan or policy may become an important factor in most cases. The evidence may be
consistent with the existence of a plan or policy, or may even show such existence, and
the existence of a plan or policy may facilitate proof of the crime.’’42 Thus, at least
theoretically, an individual acting alone, without any state involvement, may still
perpetrate the crime of genocide, provided that he or she intends to destroy a protected
group in whole or in part.

Groups Protected
In Akayesu, the ICTR provided an imaginative and somewhat radical construction of
the groups protected by the 1948 definition, which uses the adjectives ‘‘national,
ethnical, racial or religious.’’ Concerned that none of the four terms of the definition
might apply to Rwanda’s Tutsi minority, the principal victim of the 1994 atrocities, the
tribunal concluded that the UNCG could still extend to certain other groups, although
their precise definition was elusive. Pledging fidelity to the convention’s drafters,
the Akayesu judgment declares,
On reading through the travaux pre´paratoires of the Genocide Convention (Summary
Records of the meetings of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly,
21 September–10 December 1948, Official Records of the General Assembly), it appears
that the crime of genocide was allegedly perceived as targeting only ‘‘stable’’ groups,
constituted in a permanent fashion and membership of which is determined by birth,
with the exclusion of the more ‘‘mobile’’ groups which one joins through individual
voluntary commitment, such as political and economic groups. Therefore, a common
criterion in the four types of groups protected by the Genocide Convention is that
membership in such groups would seem to be normally not challengeable by its
98

Evolving Interpretations of the Crime of Genocide

members, who belong to it automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often
irremediable manner.

The Trial Chamber continues,
Moreover, the Chamber considered whether the groups protected by the Genocide
Convention, echoed in Article 2 of the Statute, should be limited to only the four groups
expressly mentioned and whether they should not also include any group which is
stable and permanent like the said four groups. In other words, the question that arises
is whether it would be impossible to punish the physical destruction of a group as such
under the Genocide Convention, if the said group, although stable and membership is
by birth, does not meet the definition of any one of the four groups expressly protected
by the Genocide Convention. In the opinion of the Chamber, it is particularly important
to respect the intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention, which according to
the travaux pre´paratoires, was patently to ensure the protection of any stable and
permanent group.43

The same ICTR chamber, in a subsequent decision, seems to hedge its remarks
somewhat: ‘‘It appears from a reading of the travaux pre´paratoires of the Genocide
Convention that certain groups, such as political and economic groups have been
excluded from the protected groups, because they are considered to be ‘‘mobile groups’’
which one joins through individual, political commitment. That would seem to suggest
a contrario that the Convention was presumably intended to cover relatively stable
and permanent groups.’’44
This interpretation appeared to many at the time to be creative and progressive,
but it has not been confirmed by the Appeals Chambers of the tribunals, and it looks
increasingly idiosyncratic as time goes by. Nevertheless, other authorities confirm
that the list of groups in the UNCG definition should receive a large and liberal
interpretation. In January 2005, a non-judicial commission of inquiry established by
the United Nations to investigate allegations of genocide in Darfur, in western
Sudan, wrote that ‘‘the principle of interpretation of international rules whereby one
should give such rules their maximum effect (principle of effectiveness, also expressed
by the Latin maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat) suggests that the rules
on genocide should be construed in such a manner as to give them their maximum
legal effects.’’45

‘‘In whole or in part’’
The 1948 definition of genocide speaks of the destruction of a group ‘‘in whole or in
part.’’ It was a noble attempt by the drafters to reach consensus, but in reality the
General Assembly used ambiguous terms and left their clarification to judges in
subsequent prosecutions. The 1995 Srebrenica massacre confronted the ICTY with the
need to expound upon the meaning of ‘‘in whole or in part.’’ According to the ICTY
Appeals Chamber, a perpetrator of genocide must intend to destroy a substantial part
of the group. The chamber explains,
The determination of when the targeted part is substantial enough to meet this
requirement may involve a number of considerations. The numeric size of the targeted
part of the group is the necessary and important starting point, though not in all cases
the ending point of the inquiry. The number of individuals targeted should be evaluated
not only in absolute terms, but also in relation to the overall size of the entire group.
In addition to the numeric size of the targeted portion, its prominence within the group
can be a useful consideration. If a specific part of the group is emblematic of the overall
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group, or is essential to its survival, that may support a finding that the part qualifies
as substantial.46

The Appeals Chamber notes that the Bosnian Muslim population in Srebrenica, or the
Bosnian Muslims of Eastern Bosnia, a group estimated to comprise about 40,000
people, met this definition. Though numerically not very significant compared to the
Bosnian Muslim population as a whole, it occupied a strategic location and was thus
key to the survival of the Bosnian Muslim nation as a whole.47

Ethnic Cleansing
The expression ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ may have been used for the first time immediately
after World War II by Poles and Czechs intending to ‘‘purify’’ their countries of
Germans and Ukrainians. But if this is the case, the language is the direct descendant
of expressions used by the Nazis in their racial ‘‘hygiene’’ programs. The term for the
latter was sauberung (‘‘cleaning’’), and their goal was to make Germany territory
judenrein, that is, clean of Jews.48 ‘‘Ethnic cleansing’’ resurfaced in 1981 in Yugoslav
media accounts of the establishment of ‘‘ethnically clean territories’’ in Kosovo.49 The
term entered the international vocabulary in 1992 when it was used to describe
policies pursued by the various parties to the Yugoslav conflict in order to create
ethnically homogeneous territories.50 There have been several attempts at definition.
According to the Security Council’s Commission of Experts on violations of
humanitarian law during the Yugoslav war, ‘‘the expression ‘ethnic cleansing’ is
relatively new. Considered in the context of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia,
‘ethnic cleansing’ means rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or
intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.’’51 The commission
considered techniques of ethnic cleansing to include murder, torture, arbitrary arrest
and detention, extrajudicial executions, sexual assault, confinement of civilian
populations in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of
civilian populations, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians
and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property.52
In Krstic´, the ICTY Trial Chamber said ‘‘there are obvious similarities between a
genocidal policy and the policy commonly known as ‘ethnic cleansing.’’’53 The Trial
Chamber seemed to understand that it was necessary to expand the scope of the term
‘‘destroy’’ in the introductory sentence, or chapeau, of the definition of genocide in
order to cover ‘‘acts that involved cultural and other non-physical forms of group
destruction.’’54 But the judgment also states,
Customary international law limits the definition of genocide to those acts seeking the
physical or biological destruction of all or part of the group. An enterprise attacking
only the cultural or sociological characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate
these elements which give to that group its own identity distinct from the rest of the
community would not fall under the definition of genocide.55

The Appeals Chamber appeared to endorse this approach.56
Nevertheless, in a very recent decision, another trial chamber has ruled that
genocide occurs when there is deportation or some other forced displacement of
populations, even in the absence of evidence of a plan for physical extermination.
Although the Srebrenica massacre involved the summary execution of approximately
7,000 men and boys, the women, children, and elderly were moved from the area
in buses, raising questions about whether the Bosnian Serb forces really intended
the physical extermination of the entire group or whether they only sought to
eliminate persons likely to be enemy combatants. A massacre of prisoners would not,
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in and of itself, amount to genocide. In Blagojevic´, the ICTY Trial Chamber concluded
that the forced displacement of women, children, and elderly people amounted to
genocide:
The Trial Chamber is convinced that the forced displacement of women, children,
and elderly people was itself a traumatic experience, which, in the circumstances of this
case, reaches the requisite level of causing serious mental harm under Article 4(2)(b) of
the Statute. The forced displacement began with the Bosnian Muslim population
fleeing from the enclave after a five-day military offensive, while being shot at as they
moved from Srebrenica town to Potočari in search of refuge from the fighting. Leaving
their homes and possessions, the Bosnian Muslims did so after determining that it was
simply impossible to remain safe in Srebrenica town . . . Having left Srebrenica to escape
from the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Muslim population saw that they must move
farther than Potočari to be safe. As they boarded the buses, without being asked even
for their name, the Bosnian Muslims saw the smoke from their homes being burned
and knew that this was not a temporary displacement for their immediate safety.
Rather, this displacement was a critical step in achieving the ultimate objective of the
attack on the Srebrenica enclave to eliminate the Bosnian Muslim population from
the enclave.57

The Trial Chamber concludes the discussion of this point by stating that ‘‘the
perpetrators intended that the forcible transfer, and the way it was carried out, would
cause serious mental harm to the victims’’ and that this fulfills the requirements of
Article II of the 1948 definition, set out without significant change in Article 4(2) of the
ICTY Statute.58

Complicity in Genocide
The ad hoc tribunals have addressed cases in which senior officials played a secondary
role in genocidal acts but there were doubts that these people actually intended to
destroy the group. In prosecuting these officials as accomplices rather than principal
perpetrators, the ICTY and ICTR Appeals Chambers have held that a conviction may
be entered for ‘‘aiding and abetting’’ genocide,59 or for ‘‘complicity’’ in genocide,60 even
in the absence of sufficient evidence that the accused person possessed criminal intent
to commit genocide. These decisions are not exactly elegant in their legal reasoning,
and they strongly hint at compromises among a divided bench. Nevertheless, they
now stand as the state of the law, and they provide a further demonstration of the
general trend toward enlargement of the definition of genocide that appears in
the 1948 UNCG.
The ICTY Appeals Chamber has also found that it is possible to commit genocide as
part of a ‘‘joint criminal enterprise.’’ The expression ‘‘joint criminal enterprise’’ is used
to describe the liability of an individual who participates in a criminal activity with
others. As a member of this ‘‘joint criminal enterprise,’’ the accused may be convicted of
acts that he or she did not actually intend, to the extent that these were reasonably
foreseeable consequences of the criminal activity. To some judges, it appeared that a
conviction for genocide, which requires proof that the offender committed acts ‘‘with
intent to destroy’’ the group, in whole or in part, was theoretically incompatible with
the entire concept of the joint criminal enterprise.61 However, the prosecutor
successfully challenged one of these rulings, and the ICTY Appeals Chamber has
established that convictions for genocide are possible under the ‘‘joint criminal
enterprise’’ mode of liability.62
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Conclusions
The definition of genocide adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1948
represents a dilution of a relatively broad concept proposed by Raphael Lemkin four
years earlier. The narrowness of the definition must be appreciated in the context of
the time. States were being asked to accept an unprecedented encroachment on their
sovereignty, namely, the existence of international obligations with respect to their
treatment of civilians of their own nationality within their own borders. The only
comparable commitments with respect to human-rights abuses committed in peacetime are the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid63 and the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.64 Both apartheid and torture may
constitute crimes against humanity, but a more general undertaking with respect to
crimes against humanity in their broad sense had to wait until 1998, with the adoption
of the Rome Statute.
Had the Nuremberg trial taken a larger view of crimes against humanity by
acknowledging that they could be committed in peacetime as well as in wartime, there
might never have been a UNCG. Work on that convention was largely an initiative to
correct the lacuna in the Nuremberg definition of crimes against humanity. But the
tension that existed between genocide and crimes against humanity in the post-war
years no longer exists, given recognition under contemporary international law that
crimes against humanity, like genocide, may be committed in time of peace.
Debates about historic cases of genocide need to be reassessed in light of evolving
case law. In a series of recent decisions, the international criminal tribunals have
broadened the reach of the 1948 definition; it has been held to apply to a somewhat
more expansive category of groups than is listed in the text of the definition. No proof
of state involvement, or of a policy or plan, is necessary to establish that genocide has
been committed; it may even be perpetrated by an individual acting alone. As for those
who participate in the crime of genocide, prosecutors need not establish that they
actually had a genocidal intent, as long as they were in some way accomplices to
the crime. Finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, the concept of genocide has
been extended to acts that compromise the survival of a group, such as forced
displacements, even when there are doubts about the intent to physically exterminate
the group.
None of this can be particularly comforting to those who have tried to deny that the
massacres of Armenians within Turkey in 1915 constituted one of the great genocides
of the twentieth century.
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